

Decumulation of Retirement Savings: *Are Modern Tontines the Solution?*¹

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¹Gold Open Access: *“Optimal performance of a tontine overlay subject to withdrawal constraints,”* ASTIN Bulletin (2024)

Motivation

Defined Benefit Plans (DB) are disappearing

- Corporations/governments no longer willing to take risk of DB plans

Recent survey² P7 countries³

- Defined Contribution (DC)⁴ plan assets: 55% of all pension assets
- Some examples
 - Australia 87% DC
 - US 65% DC
 - Canada 43% DC
 - ...
 - Japan 5% DC

Netherlands → *Collective* DC plan (2027)⁵

²Thinking Ahead Institute (2023)

³Australia, Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, US

⁴DC plan: retiree takes on all investment risk

⁵See “*Can DC participants trust the competence of Dutch pension funds,*” working paper, Georgetown University

The retiree dilemma (Defined Contribution (DC))

A retiree with savings in a DC plan^{6 7} has to decide on

- An investment strategy (stocks vs. bonds)
- A decumulation schedule

The retiree now has two major sources of risk

- Investment risk
- Longevity risk (running out of cash before death)

William Sharpe (Nobel Laureate in Economics) calls this

“The nastiest hardest problem in finance”

⁶In a DC plan, the retiree is responsible for investment/decumulation

⁷RRSP (Canada), SIPP (UK), 401(k)(US), Super Fund (Australia)

The Four per Cent Rule

Based on rolling 30-year historical periods, Bengen (1994) showed:

A retiree who

- Invested in a portfolio of 50% bonds, 50% stocks (US), rebalanced annually
- Withdrew 4% of initial capital (adjusted for inflation) annually
 - Would never have run out of cash, over any rolling 30-year period (from 1926)

Criticism

- Simplistic asset allocation strategy
- Simplistic withdrawal strategy
- Rolling 30 year periods contain large overlaps
 - Underestimates risk of portfolio depletion

Bengen rule

“Play the long game. A retirement income plan should be based on planning to live, not planning to die. A long life will be expensive to support, and it should take precedence over death planning.” Pfau (2018)

Note that Bengen rule is based on assumption that 65-year old will live to be 95

- Should we mortality weight the cash flows (as in an annuity)?
- Example: median life expectancy of 65-year old male $\simeq 87$.
 - Effectively, mortality weighting will weight minimum cash flow of 87-year old by $1/2$
 - If I am 87, and alive, I need 100% of my minimum cash flows
 - If I am dead, I need zero dollars
- We will consider an individual investor, not averaging over a population
 - 30 year retirement, no mortality weighting
 - Consistent with Bengen approach

Fear of running out of cash

Recent survey⁸

- Majority of pre-retirees fear exhausting their savings in retirement more than death

In Canada, a 65-year old male

- Probability of 0.13 of living to be 95
- Probability of 0.02 of living to be 100

Conservative strategy:

→ Assume 30 year retirement (as in Bengen (1994)).

Other assets can be used to hedge extreme longevity⁹

⁸2017 Allianz Generations Ahead Study - Quick Facts #1. (2017), Allianz

⁹Real estate

Objective of this talk

Determine a decumulation strategy which has

- Variable withdrawals (minimum and maximum constraints)
- Minimizes risk of portfolio depletion
- Maximizes total expected withdrawals
- Allows for dynamic, non-deterministic asset allocation
- Pool longevity risk using a Modern Tontine overlay

We will treat this as a problem in optimal stochastic control

Modern Tontines (Individual Tontine Account)

DC members make irrevocable investment in a pooled fund

- If the member dies during a year, their assets distributed to the other members as longevity credits
- The sharing rule is actuarially fair, i.e. expected gain from participating is zero
 - If you are older or have more assets
 - You get a larger share of longevity credits

Advantage:

- Transparent, peer-to-peer risk sharing: DeFi¹⁰
- Can decide your own investment strategy
- Expected withdrawals larger than a conventional TradFi¹¹ product
 - Retiree bears investment risk, systematic mortality risk
 - Assets forfeited on death (as in conventional DB plan, annuity)

¹⁰Decentralized Finance

¹¹Traditional Finance

Longevity Credits: Example

CPM2014 Life table: theoretical longevity credit

- Yearly credit for 76-year old male: 2%
- Yearly credit for 86-year old male: 8%
- Yearly credit for 96-year old male: 33%

Example:

- 85 year-old, living member of pool on January 1, 2024
- Total wealth W in account (December 31, 2024)
- If he is still alive on January 1, 2025 (now 86 year old)
 - He will earn longevity credit of $0.08W$


Theoretical credit depends only on

- Your age and your account balance

Does not depend on how anyone else invests, their age, or their account balances!¹².

¹²This is a counterintuitive result, see R. Fullmer, Tontines: a practitioner's guide, CFA Institute (2019), and references therein

Tontines at a glance



How does this work in practice?

Define for each year:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Group} \\ \text{Gain} \end{array} \right\} = G = \frac{\text{Total actual assets forfeited due to deaths in pool}}{\text{Total expected longevity credits for survivors}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Actual longevity credit for each investor} \\ & = \text{Theoretical Credit} \times G \end{aligned}$$

This ensures that total longevity credits handed out

→ Equals total assets forfeited

Can show that $E[G] = 1$, $Var[G] \rightarrow 0$ if

- Pool is sufficiently large
- Diversity condition holds ¹³

¹³The expected total longevity credits must be large compared to any members expected credit. Simulations: perpetual pool size \simeq 5,000-15,000.

Formulation

Investor has access to two funds

- A broad stock market index fund
 - *Amount* in stock index S_t
- A constant maturity bond index fund
 - *Amount* in bond index B_t

$$\text{Total Wealth } W_t = S_t + B_t \quad (1)$$

Model the returns of both indexes

- Parametric, jump diffusion
- Non-zero stock-bond correlation
- Fit parameters to market data 1926:1-2020:12
↔ All returns adjusted for inflation

Notation

Withdraw/rebalance at discrete times $t_i \in [0, T]$

The investor has two controls at each rebalancing time

q_i = Amount of withdrawal

p_i = Fraction in stocks after withdrawal

$$\begin{aligned} W_i^- &= \text{wealth after tontine gains and fees} \\ &\quad \text{before withdrawals} \\ &= \underbrace{(S_i^- + B_i^-)}_{\text{Before gains/fees}} \underbrace{(1 + \text{tontine gain})(1 - \text{fees})}_{\text{tontine gains and fees}} \end{aligned}$$

At t_i^+ , the investor withdraws q_i

$$W_i^+ = W_i^- - q_i$$

Rebalancing

Recall that

W_i^- = wealth after tontine gains and fees
before withdrawals

W_i^+ = wealth after withdrawals

Then, the investor rebalances the portfolio

$$S_i^+ = p_i W_i^+$$

$$B_i^+ = (1 - p_i) W_i^+$$

Controls

Constraints on controls

$q_i \in [q_{\min}, q_{\max}]$; withdrawal amount

$p_i \in [0, 1]$; fraction in stocks

\Rightarrow no shorting, no leverage

Set of controls

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ (q_i(\cdot), p_i(\cdot)) : i = 0, \dots, M \} \quad (2)$$

Reward and Risk

Reward: Expected total (real) withdrawals (EW)

$$\text{EW} = E \left[\overbrace{\sum_i q_i}^{\text{total withdrawals}} \right]$$

$E[\cdot] = \text{Expectation}$

Risk measure: Expected Shortfall ES

$$ES(5\%) \equiv \left\{ \text{Mean of worst 5\% of } W_T \right\}$$

$W_T = \text{terminal wealth at } t = T$

ES defined in terms of final wealth, *not losses*¹⁴

→ Larger is better

¹⁴ES is basically the negative of CVAR

Objective Function

Multi-objective problem \rightarrow scalarization approach for Pareto points

Find controls \mathcal{P} which maximize (scalarization parameter $\kappa > 0$)¹⁵

$$\sup_{\mathcal{P}} \left\{ EW + \kappa ES \right\}$$
$$\sup_{\mathcal{P}} \left\{ \overbrace{E_{\mathcal{P}} \left[\sum_i q_i \right]}^{\text{total withdrawals}} + \kappa \left(\overbrace{\frac{E_{\mathcal{P}} [W_T \mathbf{1}_{W_T \leq W^*}]}{.05}}^{\text{mean worst 5\% outcomes}} \right) \right\}$$

s.t. $Prob[W_T \leq W^*] = .05$

Varying κ traces out the efficient frontier in the (EW, ES) plane

¹⁵ $E_{\mathcal{P}}[\cdot] \equiv$ expectation under control \mathcal{P} .

EW-ES Objective Function

Given an expectation under control $E_{\mathcal{P}}[\cdot]$ (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ES}_{5\%} &= \sup_{W^*} E_{\mathcal{P}} \left[H(W_T, W^*) \right] \\ H(W_T, W^*) &= \left(W^* + \frac{1}{.05} [\min(W_T - W^*, 0)] \right) \end{aligned}$$

Reformulate objective function:

$$\sup_{\mathcal{P}} \sup_{W^*} E_{\mathcal{P}} \left\{ \overbrace{\sum_i q_i}^{\text{total withdrawals}} + \kappa \overbrace{H(W_T, W^*)}^{\text{mean worst 5\% } W_T} \right\}$$

Under above assumptions: can show that¹⁶

$$q_i = q_i(W_i^-) \quad ; \quad p_i = p_i(W_i^+)$$

¹⁶ q_i withdrawal, p_i fraction in stocks, W^\pm wealth before/after withdrawals

Time Consistency

The EW-ES objective function is not formally *time consistent*

Time inconsistency

⇒ Investor has incentive to deviate from initial optimal policy at later times

EW-ES policy computed at time zero

↔ Pre-commitment policy

Induced time consistent policy

At t_0 we compute the pre-commitment EW-ES control

- For $t > t_0$ we assume that the investor follows the *induced time consistent* control (Strub et al (2019))
- This control is identical to the pre-commitment control at t_0
- No incentive to deviate from this control at $t > t_0$

Induced time consistent control determined from (fixed W^*)

$$\sup_{\mathcal{P}} E_{\mathcal{P}} \left\{ \sum_i q_i + \kappa H(W_T, W^*) \right\}$$

W^* from pre-commitment solution at time zero

Alternative: equilibrium mean-ES control

↔ Does not actually control tail risk! (Forsyth(2020)) ¹⁷

¹⁷For more discussion of time consistency, induced time consistency, pre-commitment, see Bjork et al (2021), Vigna (2020, 2022), Strub et al (2019), Forsyth (2020)

Scenario: all amounts indexed to inflation

- DC account at $t = 0$ (age 65) \$1,000K (one million)
 - Minimum withdrawal from DC account \$40K per year¹⁸
 - Maximum withdrawal from DC \$80K per year
 - Fees: 50bps per year
- No shorting, no leverage, annual rebalancing
- Investment Horizon: $T = 30$ years, i.e. from age 65 to 95
 - ↪ Tontine gains: CPM 2014 mortality table
- Assume pool is very large, diverse so that
 - ↪ Group Gain $G \equiv 1$
- Retiree owns mortgage-free real estate worth \$400K
 - ↪ Hedge of last resort (reverse mortgage)

¹⁸Never less than Bengen rule: $40K/1000K = 4\%$

Scenario II

Why do we include real estate in the scenario?

Since $q_{\min} = 40K$ per year, W_t can become negative

- When $W_t < 0$, assume retiree is borrowing, using a reverse mortgage¹⁹
 - Reverse mortgages allow borrowing of 50% of home value
 - In our case: \$200K
- Once $W_t < 0$
 - All stocks are liquidated
 - Debt accumulates at borrowing rate
- If $W_T > 0$, then real-estate is a bequest
- Real estate is a hedge of last resort: not fungible with other wealth
 - This mental bucketing of real estate is a well-known behavioral finance result.²⁰

¹⁹See Pfeiffer et al, Journal of Financial Planning (2013)

²⁰I also observe this with my fellow retirees: real-estate is a separate bucket

Numerical Method I

Pre-commitment control at t_0 (same as induced time consistent control)

Interchange $\sup \sup(\dots)$

$$\sup_{W^*} \overbrace{\sup_{\mathcal{P}} E_{\mathcal{P}} \left\{ \sum_i q_i + \kappa H(W_T, W^*) \right\}}^{\text{Solve using Dynamic Programming (fixed } W^*)}$$

*maximize over W^**

Solve inner DP problem using PIDE methods

Numerical Method II

Inner maximization: dynamic programming

- Conditional expectations at t_i^+
 - Solve linear 2-d PIDE
 - Use ϵ -monotone Fourier method (Forsyth and Labahn (2019))
- Optimal controls at each rebalancing time
 - Discretize controls
 - Find maximum by exhaustive search
- Guaranteed to converge to the solution as discretization parameters $\rightarrow 0$

Outer maximization over W^*

- Discretize W^* , use coarse PIDE grid
 - \rightarrow Find optimal W^* by exhaustive search
- Use coarse grid W^* as starting point for 1-d optimization on finer grids

Data

Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) US

- Cap weighted index, all stocks on all major US exchanges
1926:1-2020:12
- US 30-day T-bill²¹
- Monthly data, inflation adjusted by CPI

Synthetic Market

- Stock/bond returns driven by parametric jump-diffusion model, calibrated to data
- Optimal controls computed in the *synthetic* market


Historical market

- Stock/bond returns from stationary block bootstrap resampling of actual data²²
- No assumptions about stock/bond processes
- Used to test control robustness computed in the synthetic market

²¹Slightly better results with 10 year Treasuries

²²Dichtl et al (2016, Appl. Econ.), Anarkulova et al (JFE,2022)

Synthetic Market Results (parametric model)



Efficient frontier: fixed ES
↔ Largest possible expected withdrawal
↔ Pareto optimal points

- Farther to right is better
- Farther up is better


Base case fee 50bps

X-axis: expected shortfall (larger better)

Y-axis: Expected annualized withdrawal (larger better)

No Tontine: Optimal strategy, no Tontine overlay

Effect of Random G (group gain)



Compute control with $G \equiv 1$

↔ Test with random G (Monte Carlo simulation)

Random G: simulation of pool with 15K members

Fit to normal distribution with $E[G] = 1$, $std[G] = 0.1^a$


^aFullmer and Sabin (2019) CFA white paper

$$\text{Actual Mortality Credit} = \text{Theoretical Credit} \times \overbrace{G}^{\text{Group Gain}}$$

Random G Statistics

- Different ages, genders, investment strategies
- Perpetual pool, random initial wealth

Efficient Frontier: Historical Market (bootstrap resampling)



Synthetic: Control computed using parametric model


Blk = 2.0: Control tested on block bootstrap resampled historical data
↪ Blocksize = 2yrs
↪ Out-of-sample test

Bengen: 4% rule

No Tontine: Optimal strategy, no Tontine overlay

- X-axis: expected shortfall (larger better)
- Y-axis: Expected annualized withdrawal (larger better)

How bad is the Bengen 4% rule? (Bootstrap simulations)



Bengen:

↪ $EW = +40K/\text{year}^a$

↪ Expected shortfall = -303K !

Tontine:

↪ $EW = +69K/\text{year}$

↪ Expected shortfall = +204K

^aEW = Expected annualized Withdrawals

- Tontine: $(EW, ES) = (69, +204)$

- Never withdraws less than Bengen

- Expected withdrawals 6.9%/year²³


- $ES = +204K$ at age 95

- Mortality credit for 95 year old: $\simeq 33\%$ per year!


²³6.9% of initial capital, adjusted for inflation.

Point on Frontier: $(EW, ES) = (69K/\text{year}, +204)$

Percentiles: fraction in equities



Percentiles: withdrawals




→ $ES \simeq +204$

→ 5th percentile wealth at $t = 30 \simeq +300K$

→ Average withdrawal $\simeq 69K/\text{year}$

Asset Allocation Heat Map



Point on Frontier:
(EW, ES) = (69K/year,
+204K)

Blue: 100% bonds
Red: 100% stocks

Optimal fraction in
stocks

Function of observed
wealth, time

- Over 30 years

→ Fraction in stocks ≤ 0.60 with 95% probability

Conclusions

- Tontine overlay: peer to peer longevity risk sharing
 - Investment/withdrawal strategy entirely under retiree's control
- Significantly larger expected withdrawals compared to industry standard (Bengen)
 - ⇒ Significantly smaller probability of running out of cash
- Bootstrap resampling
 - ⇒ controls are robust
- Tontine provider has no risk
 - Fees can be very low
- But there is no free lunch
 - "If you want more money when you are alive, you have to give up some when you are dead." (Moshe Milevsky)*

A thought about life

To paraphrase Leonard Cohen²⁴

"The problem with turning 70, is that I can no longer think of myself as a young man."



- When I first heard this, I thought this was ridiculous
 - Of course, a 70-year old is a very old man
- Now, I understand exactly what Leonard was saying

²⁴Famous Canadian songwriter/singer, perhaps best known for *"Hallelujah."*